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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 15-3387
___________
ZONG TAN ZOU,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A200-916-113)
Immigration Judge: Honorable Amiena A. Khan
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 15, 2016
Before: AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR. and SLOVITER1, Circuit Judges
(Filed: May 4, 2016)
___________
OPINION*
___________
1

The Honorable Dolores K. Sloviter participated in the decision in this case. Judge
Sloviter assumed inactive status on April 4, 2016 after the submission date, but before the
filing of the opinion. This opinion is filed by a quorum of the panel pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 46(d) and Third Circuit I.O.P. Chapter 12.
*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

PER CURIAM
Zong Tan Zou petitions for review of his final order of removal. We will deny the
petition.
I.
Zou is a citizen of China who entered the United States illegally in 2010 and who
concedes that he is removable for that reason. Zou applied for asylum, withholding of
removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture. Zou claims to have suffered
past persecution and to face persecution and torture in the future on account of his
opposition to China’s family planning policies.
In particular, Zou claims that he tried to physically prevent family planning cadres
from taking his girlfriend to a hospital for a forced abortion. As a result, the cadres
pushed Zou to the ground and struck him approximately 20 times all over his body. The
beating left him with bruises and a bloody nose. The cadres then took Zou to the police,
who administered a similar beating when he refused to admit that he had interfered with
the cadres and had violated the family planning policies. The police detained Zou for
eight days and gave him inadequate food before releasing him when his family paid a
5,000 RMB fine. Zou sought medical attention, and a doctor provided him with antiinflammatory medication and unidentified pain killers. The cadres also sent a letter to his
employer, which terminated his employment. Zou later went to a family planning office
and accused them of killing his baby and violating his human rights. The officials did not
2

harm him, but they kicked him out of the office and warned him that they would take him
back to the police if he returned. Zou left for the United States shortly thereafter. He
testified that no officials have contacted his parents since he left and that he does not
know if anyone is looking for him in China.
The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) found Zou’s testimony credible but denied relief
and ordered his removal to China. The IJ denied asylum because she concluded that
Zou’s beatings and detention did not rise to the level of persecution and that he did not
otherwise show a well-founded fear of persecution in the future. The IJ also denied
withholding because she concluded that Zou failed to prove a likelihood of persecution or
torture if returned. Zou appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), which
dismissed his appeal on the merits. The BIA essentially agreed with the IJ and rejected
Zou’s argument that the IJ failed to address the totality of the circumstances in
concluding that he had not suffered past persecution.
Zou was represented by counsel before the IJ and BIA, but he petitions for review
pro se. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).
II.
The only issue that Zou raises in his brief is whether the BIA erred in determining
that his past physical mistreatment in China did not rise to the level of persecution, which
would have given rise to a rebuttable presumption that he has a well-founded fear of
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persecution in the future. See Jarbough v. Att’y Gen., 483 F.3d 184, 191 (3d Cir. 2007).2
We review the BIA’s ruling on this issue for substantial evidence and may disturb it
“only if the evidence compels a contrary conclusion.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).3 To
the extent that the BIA’s ruling implicates an issue of law, we review it de novo. See
Huang v. Att’y Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 379 (3d Cir. 2010).
Zou relies on Second Circuit authority for the proposition that his mistreatment
“may well” have risen to the level of persecution because it occurred in a custodial
context and was inflicted on a protected ground. See, e.g., Beskovic v. Gonzales, 467
F.3d 223, 226 (2d Cir. 2006). The BIA, however, properly relied on this Court’s
precedent in concluding otherwise.
We have held that persecution encompasses only “severe” and “extreme conduct”
and “does not encompass all treatment that our society regards as unfair, unjust, or even
unlawful or unconstitutional.” Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 & n.10 (3d Cir. 1993).
Since then, we have repeatedly held that isolated beatings and detentions that do not
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Zou also asserts at various points that the IJ erred in making an adverse credibility
determination, but the IJ made no such determination and instead deemed Zou’s
testimony credible.
3

The Government argues that this standard applies but that we should refer to it as the
“compelling evidence” standard rather than the “substantial evidence” standard because
the statute in which it is set forth does not use the term “substantial evidence.” See 8
U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). As we have explained, however, that statute codified the
substantial evidence standard as the United States Supreme Court had defined it. See
Korytnyuk v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 272, 286 (3d Cir. 2005). We see no reason to depart
from the substantial evidence nomenclature, which is both well-established and widely
understood.
4

result in serious injury do not rise to the level of persecution. See, e.g., Kibinda v. Att’y
Gen., 477 F.3d 113, 119-20 (3d Cir. 2007) (five-day detention and beating requiring
stitches and leaving a scar was not “severe enough to constitute persecution under our
stringent standard”); see also Voci v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 607, 615 (3d Cir. 2005) (“While
this Court has not yet drawn a precise line concerning where a simple beating ends and
persecution begins, our cases suggest that isolated incidents that do not result in serious
injury do not rise to the level of persecution.”).
As the BIA explained in this case, Zou’s beatings and detention were only two
isolated incidents on the same day and did not appear to result in any serious harm. The
BIA’s conclusion is consistent both with our precedent and with the record. Zou has not
acknowledged our precedent in this area. Zou also has raised no evidence of record
calling the BIA’s conclusion into question, and our review reveals no such evidence. In
addition to Zou’s physical mistreatment, the BIA expressly considered his claim in the
context of his mistreatment as a whole, including the fine paid by his family and his loss
of employment. See Cheng v. Att’y Gen., 623 F.3d 175, 192-93 (3d Cir. 2010). Zou has
not raised any claim of error in that regard, and we discern no basis for one.4
III.

The Government identifies a single sentence in Zou’s brief in which he may be arguing
that he demonstrated a well-founded fear of persecution even in the absence of his past
mistreatment. (Pet’r’s Br. at 19.) The sentence actually refers only to past persecution.
To the extent that it could be read otherwise, however, it raises no specific challenge to
the BIA’s ruling and our review reveals no basis for such a challenge for the reasons
argued by the Government and explained by the BIA.
5
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For these reasons, we will deny Zou’s petition for review.
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